CVE alerts for
Ubuntu

@fastify/static evaluates the allowedPath callback before normalizing dot segments and duplicate path separators in the pathname used for file resolution. Versions up to and including 10.1.1 are affected. An unauthenticated attacker can bypass allowedPath restrictions by requesting equivalent non-canonical pathnames, causing files that were intended to be denied to be served anyway. The bypass does not allow access outside the configured static root by itself, it defeats path-based filtering only. The issue is patched in @fastify/static 10.1.2.

In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as 'datstart + dname_valid(datstart, ...)' and passes it straight to 'query_dname_tolower()' without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause 'query_dname_tolower()' to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker 'env->scratch_buffer', past the end of that heap allocation if 'msg-buffer-size' has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.